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Abstract: This article deals with the international responsibility of 
States for their breach of cultural heritage obligations in the event of 
armed conflicts. The topic is both highly important and challenging. 
In fact, the implementation of State responsibility for the breach of 
a cultural heritage obligation may meet with serious practical dif-
ficulties in attributing unlawful conduct to a given State. Moreover, 
political circumstances often favour the prosecution of individual 
perpetrators, even if they acted under the direction or control of 
a State, rather than invoking the responsibility of that State. Viewed 
in such light, this article briefly discusses the sources and status of 
international cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict, then 
deals with the consequences of their violation in international prac-
tice. It also discusses the resolution Succession of States in Matters 
of International Responsibility, adopted this year by the Institute of 
International Law (IIL), and analyses its potential outcomes in rela-
tion to cultural heritage obligations applicable to States’ conduct in 
armed conflicts.
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Whose Responsibility?
Although the protection of cultural heritage is a relatively new area of international 
law, it has already created a complex system of international obligations.1 These re-
fer particularly to the regime for the protection of cultural heritage in the event of 
armed conflict and occupation. While this is still an expanding area of international 
law-making, a number of questions arise as to the consequences of a breach of such 
obligations. In fact, various entities may bear responsibility for international of-
fences against cultural heritage committed during an armed conflict. Yet, the rules 
governing their responsibility are regulated under distinct, though interconnected, 
normative regimes of international law. 
Since the judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal2 cer-
tain offences committed by individuals against cultural heritage during armed 
conflicts may be considered as international crimes and give rise to individual 
criminal responsibility.3 After the Second World War the regime of individu-
al criminal responsibility for the violation of international obligations towards 
cultural heritage was consolidated in international humanitarian law, under 
the 1954 Hague Convention4 and the 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions.5 But the major developments have taken place more re-
cently. In light of the destruction of cultural heritage in the Balkans, the Second 
 
1 For a conceptual overview, see inter alia J. Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2015; F. Francioni, Evolving Framework for the Protection of Cultural Heritage in International 
Law, in: S. Borelli, F. Lenzerini (eds.), Cultural Heritage, Cultural Rights, Cultural Diversity. New Developments 
in International Law, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden – Boston 2012, pp. 3-28; G. Carducci, The Growing Complexity of 
International Art Law: Conflicts of Law, Mandatory Rules, UNSC Resolutions and EU Regulations, in: B.T. Hoff-
man (ed.), Art and Cultural Heritage. Law, Policy and Practice, Cambridge University Press, New York 2006, 
pp. 68-86.
2 See J. Nowlan, Cultural Property and the Nuremberg War Crimes Trial, “Humanitares Volkerrecht” 1993, 
Vol. 4, pp. 221-223.
3 Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945– 
-1 October 1946, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1948, Vol. 2, pp. 593-616.
4 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the First Pro-
tocol to this Convention, 14 May 1954, 249 UNTS 240, 249 UNTS 358; see Article 28 of the 1954 Hague 
Convention.
5 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3, Article 85(4)(d); Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 UNTS 609, Article 16.
149
State Responsibility and the International Protection 
of Cultural Heritage
Hague Protocol (1999)6 set up the most advanced and detailed regime of indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for offences against cultural heritage (committed 
in both international and non-international armed conflicts). Certain acts against 
cultural heritage were also criminalized under the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY).7 The practice of this international ad 
hoc tribunal also offers the most comprehensive case law to date in the area of 
individual criminal responsibility for the breach of international cultural heritage 
obligations. In addition, the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
first permanent criminal court, also refers to cultural heritage crimes,8 and the 
Court has just recently initiated a proceeding with respect to such offences (the 
proceedings against Abu Tourab).9 Yet, it needs to be stressed that the extent of 
offences against cultural property under the statutes of these tribunals is limited 
as compared to the regime of the Second Hague Protocol, both from a quantita-
tive perspective and that of differentiation on the basis of gravity.10 
The current acts against cultural heritage occurring in Syria, Iraq and Mali 
have given rise to another pressing issue – that of the international responsibility or 
corporate (group) criminal responsibility of non-State actors such as Daesh (ISIS). 
However, to date no corporate entity (non-State group) has been prosecuted by 
any municipal or international court for any international cultural heritage crime. 
Moreover, there is no such practice in relation to any other international crimes 
either. Importantly, the statutes of international criminal tribunals, including the 
Statute of Rome, provide only for jurisdiction over natural persons – not their col-
lectivities.11 Accordingly, there are so far no “accepted rules or standards for cor-
porate criminal responsibility under international law”.12 On the other hand, it has 
 
 
06 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, 2253 UNTS 212.
07 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, 
25 May 1993, UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1992); see Article 3(d).
08 Statute of the International Criminal Court (Statute of Rome), 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 90; see Articles 
8(2)(b)(ix) and 8(2)(e)(iv).
09 Abu Tourab – Ahmad Al Mahdi Al Faqi, an alleged member of Ansar Dine, a Tuareg Islamic extremist mi-
litia in North Africa, suspected of war crimes allegedly committed in 2012, in Timbuktu (Mali), by intention-
ally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion and/or historical monuments; ICC, Prosecutor 
v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, No. ICC-01/12-01/15. 
10 See A. Carcano, The Criminalization and Prosecution of Attacks against Cultural Property, in: F. Pocar, M. Pe-
drazzi, M. Frulli (eds.), War Crimes and the Conduct of Hostilities: Challenges to Adjudication and Investigation, 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2013, pp. 78-97. 
11 In fact, the above-mentioned proceedings before the ICC relating to the war crimes in Mali have been 
initiated against a member of a group, but not against the group itself.
12 J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General Part, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2013, p. 81.
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been asserted that non-State corporate actors are bound by international law 
rules. In particular this relates to non-State armed groups exercising control over 
a given territory and population.13 Thus more and more voices are postulating the 
establishment a coherent set of principles and mechanisms concerning the corpo-
rate responsibility of non-State groups for the breach of international law, beyond 
the regime of individual criminal responsibility.14
The third context, and perhaps the most important one, in which the viola-
tion of international cultural heritage obligations may be invoked is that of State 
responsibility. Indeed, from the traditional, horizontal perspective of internation-
al law, the violation of binding obligations under international law entails interna-
tional responsibility which can be invoked and implemented against those entities 
which are recognized as possessing personality on the international plane, in par-
ticular States, which still the primary subjects of international law. The regime of 
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts is regulated under cus-
tomary international law, comprehensively codified by the Articles on Responsibil-
ity of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA).15 Although the ARSIWA 
does not have the form of a treaty, many of its provisions are generally considered 
as reflecting customary international law.16
It is clear that most of the international obligations for the protection of cul-
tural heritage are made by and for States. Yet the objectives of such obligations 
have, over the years, gone beyond the exclusive cultural, political and economic 
interests of States towards general interests and values shared by the entire in-
ternational community, with increasing focus on the protection and promotion of 
human rights.17 In this regard, the breach of international cultural heritage obliga-
tions by a State may give rise to secondary obligations toward, and vested in, not 
 
 
 
13 See, for instance, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States 
of America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 392, para. 219; for a complex analysis see 
Z. Howe, Can the 1954 Hague Convention Apply to Non-State Actors?: A Study of Iraq and Libya, “Texas Inter-
national Law Journal” 2012, Vol. 47, p. 403; N. Gal-Or, C. Ryngaert, M. Noortmann (eds.), Responsibilities of 
the Non-State Actor in Armed Conflict and the Market Place: Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Findings, 
Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden – Boston 2015.
14 See article by K. Hausler, Culture under Attack: The Destruction of Cultural Heritage by non-State Armed 
Groups, “Santander Art and Culture Law Review” 2015, current issue, pp. 129-141.
15 November 2001, UN Doc. A/56/83 (2001).
16 See, for instance, J. Crawford, State Responsibility, in: Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, Oxford University Press, Heidelberg-Oxford 2006, http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:
epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1093?prd=EPIL [accessed: 11.11.2015], para. 65.
17 See, in particular, A.F. Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Cultural Heritage in International Law, in: F. Lenzerini, 
A.F. Vrdoljak (eds.), International Law for Common Goods: Normative Perspectives on Human Rights, Culture and 
Nature, Hart, Oxford 2014, p. 139.
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only a State directly injured but also in their plurality or the international commu-
nity as a whole. This common denominator, that is, the protection of goods par-
ticularly cherished by the international community, establishes a link between the 
primary rules, protecting such basic values and interests, and the secondary rules 
governing the consequences of any violation of these rules. Yet the implementa-
tion of State responsibility for the breach of a cultural heritage obligation may also 
encounter serious practical difficulties in terms of attributing a course of conduct 
to a given State. Moreover, the complex and internally fragmented system of inter-
national heritage law does not provide for any comprehensive dispute settlement 
mechanisms.18 In addition, political circumstances often favour the prosecution of 
individual perpetrators, even if they acted under the direction or control of a State, 
rather than invoking the responsibility of that State. 
In such a context, this article explores the existing regime of State responsibil-
ity for internationally wrongful acts against cultural heritage which are committed 
in the course of an armed conflict. First, it briefly discusses the sources and status 
of international cultural heritage obligations in the situation of military conflict. 
Second, it deals with the consequences of their violation in international practice. 
Finally, it recalls the resolution by the Institute of International Law (IIL) – Succession 
of States in Matters of International Responsibility – adopted in Tallinn on 28 August 
2015,19 and analyses its provisions in light of cultural heritage obligations. This re-
cent doctrinal development addresses a long-neglected “grey zone” of internation-
al law which has an important practical impact on cultural heritage matters, such as 
restitution of cultural property pillaged or displaced in the event of an armed con-
flict and reparations for cultural loss. Arguably, such a reconceptualization seems 
highly important in the light of current political and territorial reconfigurations in 
eastern Ukraine and possible final ruptures in Libya, Syria and Iraq. 
Sources and Status of Cultural Heritage Obligations 
in Armed Conflicts
In contrast to the law on international responsibility of States, cultural heritage ob-
ligations are established in the great majority of cases by multilateral treaties, and 
to a certain extent by bilateral treaties and agreements in the matter of protection, 
preservation and cooperation in matters of culture and cultural heritage. In rela-
tion to tangible cultural heritage in the event of armed conflicts, two main groups 
 
18 A. Chechi, Evaluating the Establishment of an International Cultural Heritage Court, “Art, Antiquity & Law” 
2013, Vol. 18, p. 32.
19 IIL, 14th Commission, M.G. Kohen (Rapporteur), 28 August 2015, http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/
resolutionsE/2015_Tallinn_14_en.pdf [accessed: 15.11.2015].
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of obligations can be identified:20 1) the protection and respect of cultural property 
in the event of armed conflict and occupation; 2) restoration of material unlawful-
ly appropriated and transferred from militarily occupied territories. Importantly, 
the first group refers to obligations established by substantive “primary” rules of 
international law regulating the conduct of hostilities and occupation in relation to 
cultural property, whereas the second one would primarily refer to “secondary” 
obligations of States flowing from their breach of such cultural heritage obligations. 
The destruction and pillage of property and buildings dedicated to religion, ed-
ucation, art, and science have been prohibited under binding international instru-
ments on war conduct since the Peace Conferences of 189921 and 1907.22 Yet the 
complex set of rules governing the situation of cultural property in the event of 
an armed conflict was codified after the Second World War, under the 1954 Hague 
Convention, which today binds more than 120 State Parties.23 This formalized the 
concept of “cultural property” as an autonomous legal category requiring interna-
tional protection due to the inherent value of cultural heritage for every people. 
It also recognizes that such protection is of universal concern, because “each peo-
ple make their own contribution to the culture of the world”.24 The regime estab-
lished by the 1954 Hague Convention was extended by its Second Protocol (1999) 
to cover non-international conflicts. Article 22 of this Protocol provides that the 
international regime of protection shall also “apply in the event of an armed conflict 
not of an international character, occurring within the territory of one of the Par-
ties”. Moreover, the Second Hague Protocol elaborated the provisions of the 1954 
Hague Convention relating to the safeguarding of and respect for cultural property 
 
20 The third of group of obligations under the treaty law, that has been not analyzed in this article, regards 
the duty to prosecute and impose penal or disciplinary sanctions upon individual perpetrators responsible 
for the violations of the rules of the protection of cultural property in armed conflicts. As already men-
tioned, the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions oblige their 
State parties to ensure that such adequate criminal regulations and measures are established. In addition, 
the Second Hague Protocol introduces the principle of universal jurisdiction over the most “serious viola-
tions” of the norms on the protection of cultural heritage, and obliges the parties to prosecute or extradite 
the offender regardless of his or her nationality or the location of the violation committed. The penalized 
offences not only comprise the destruction of cultural heritage, but also theft, pillage, or misappropria-
tion of cultural material. Read further M. Hector, Enhancing Individual Criminal Responsibility for Offences 
Involving Cultural Property – the Road to the Rome Statute and the 1999 Second Protocol, in: N. van Wouden-
berg, L. Lijnzaad (eds.), Protecting Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden – Boston 2010, 
pp. 69-76; R. O’Keefe, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict, Cambridge University Press, New 
York 2006, p. 236.
21 Regulations Annexed to the Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
29 July 1899, 187 Parry’s CTS 429, Article 56.
22 Regulations Annexed to the Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 
1907, 208 Parry’s CTS 77, Articles 27 and 56.
23 http://www.unesco.org/eri/la/convention.asp?KO=13637&language=E&order=alpha [accessed: 
16.11.2015].
24 The 1954 Hague Convention, Preamble.
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during the conduct of hostilities. In particular, it established a new category of en-
hanced protection for “tangible cultural heritage that is of greatest importance for 
humanity” (Article 10). Accordingly, under the Hague regime States are obliged to 
spare cultural property, provided that it does not serve for military purposes, from 
attacks in territories affected by an armed conflict, and abstain from the pillage 
and removal of cultural objects situated therein.
At the level of international treaty law, the second category of obligations 
refers to the restitution of cultural property unlawfully removed from an occu-
pied territory. The duty to return cultural property appropriated and/or removed 
from occupied territories by the use of force and/or under duress, already univer-
sally confirmed by the Allied legislation during the Second World War, particu-
larly the 1943 London Declaration,25 was codified by the First Hague Protocol 
(1954), which prohibits the export of cultural property from an occupied terri-
tory and requires the return of such property to the territory of the State from 
which it was removed. The “export and transfer of ownership of cultural property 
under compulsion arising directly or indirectly from the occupation of a country 
by a foreign power” was also regarded as “illicit” by the 1970 Convention (Arti-
cle 11).26 More recently, the obligation to restore cultural material removed from 
occupied territories has been fully recognized by the ad hoc legislation of the UN 
Security Council adopted on the basis of the Chapter VII of the UN Charter.27 
In particular, the most important provisions are to be found with respect to the 
cultural heritage of Iraq and Kuwait. According to Resolution 686 (1991),28 the 
Security Council demanded that Iraq “immediately begin to return all Kuwaiti 
property seized by Iraq, to be completed in the shortest possible period” (para-
graph 2 (d)). Resolution 1483 of 200329 went much further. In this instance, the 
Security Council decided that all member States of the United Nations “shall take 
appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return to Iraqi institutions of Iraqi cultur-
al property and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific, 
and religious importance illegally removed from the Iraq National Museum, the 
National Library, and other locations in Iraq” (paragraph 7). Thus, the resolution 
– as a binding international instrument – provided for an obligation erga omnes 
to ensure that cultural property illicitly transferred from occupied territories 
 
25 The Inter-Allied Declaration against Acts of Dispossession Committed in Territories under Enemy Oc-
cupation or Control, 5 January 1943, http://www.lootedartcommission.com/ inter-allied-declaration [ac-
cessed: 15.11.2015].
26 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Own-
ership of Cultural Property, 14 November 1970, 823 UNTS 231.
27 Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, amended in 1963 (557 UNTS 143), in 1965 
(638 UNTS 308), and in 1971 (892 UNTS 119).
28 UN Doc. S/RES/686 (1991).
29 UN Doc. S/RES/1483 (2003).
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would be returned. The latest events in Syria and in Iraq have also fostered var-
ious international measures with the objective of stopping the trafficking in or 
pillage of cultural objects and facilitating their return. The Council Regulation 
(EU) No 1332/2013 of 13 December 201330 is perhaps the most significant inter-
national instrument in this regard. It recognizes the obligation of the EU Member 
States to “return to their legitimate owners goods constituting Syrian cultural 
heritage which have been illegally removed from Syria” (3rd recital), and requires 
measures to be adopted in order “to prohibit the import, export or transfer of 
such goods” (Article 11).
The recent international practice has also demonstrated that most treaty 
rules in relation to States’ obligations towards cultural heritage reflect custom-
ary international law. Indeed, an explicit recognition of the customary nature 
of these obligations can be found in the jurisprudence of international courts.31 
In particular, the ICTY held that the intentional destruction of cultural heritage law 
is criminalized under customary international law.32 Similar conclusions were also 
reached by the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, established by the peace ac-
cords concluded in Algiers on 12 December 200033 in order to settle the disputes 
between these two States arising from events which took place during the war of 
1998-2000. The commission found Ethiopia responsible for the destruction of an 
important archaeological monument in the occupied territory of Eritrea and held 
that such an act “was a violation of customary international humanitarian law”34 
even though the 1954 Hague Convention was not applicable as neither Eritrea nor 
Ethiopia was a party to it. 
In addition, the link between the destruction of cultural heritage, its wilful 
damage and grave violations of humanitarian law has been strengthened. Accord-
ingly, the ICTY found that the destruction of cultural heritage committed with “the 
requisite of discriminatory intent”, may amount to persecution, that is, it may be 
considered as a crime against humanity.35 Moreover, if such attacks are directed 
 
30 Amending Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in 
Syria, OJ L 335, 14.12.2013, pp. 3-7.
31 See F. Lenzerini, The Role of International and Mixed Criminal Courts in the Enforcement of International 
Norms Concerning the Protection of Cultural Heritage, in: F. Francioni, J. Gordley (eds.), Enforcing International 
Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013, pp. 41-64.
32 See for example Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, ICTY Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment of the Trial 
Chamber, 26 February 2001, para. 206; Prosecutor v. Tadić, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the 
Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 98.
33 Agreement the Governments of the State of Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethio-
pia, 12 December 2000, UN Doc. A/55/686-S/2000/1183, Annex, http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/
Algiers%20Agreement.pdf [accessed: 10.11.2015].
34 Claims Commission for Eritrea and Ethiopia, “Partial Award, Central Front, Eritrea’s Claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 8 
& 22, 28” (2004), 43 ILM (2004) 1249, para. 113. 
35 Prosecutor v. Kordić and Čerkez, op. cit., para. 207.
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against cultural or religious property of a given group, they “may legitimately be 
considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group”,36 thus provid-
ing evidence of the intent (mens rea) requirement for the commission of the crime of 
genocide under the 1948 Genocide Convention.37 More recently, such an interpre-
tation of the wilful damage to cultural heritage of a group has also been confirmed 
in the caselaw of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 
Accordingly, intentional acts against cultural property have been considered as 
crimes against humanity, when committed with a discriminatory intent.38 Impor-
tantly, the nature of international offences against cultural heritage occurred in 
armed conflicts was addressed in two genocide cases before the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). These two judgements directly transposed the aquis of the 
ICTY relating to the cultural dimension of genocide (in particular the judgment in 
Kristić) to the realm of State responsibility. Accordingly, the ICJ held that attacks 
on cultural and religious property during an armed conflict constitute a violation of 
international law. Furthermore, such acts may be considered as evidence of a gen-
ocidal intent aimed at the extinction of a group.39 
Alongside the developments of relevant international case law, the customary 
notion of the obligation to respect cultural heritage in armed conflicts seems to be 
confirmed in the practice of major international organizations. In fact, such a po-
sition was taken by the UN. Accordingly, the UN Secretary-General, Kofi A. An-
nan, in his 1999 Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humani-
tarian Law set up for the protection of cultural property during operations under 
the  UN.40 Apparently, the obligations binding the UN forces are treated here as 
arising from general international law. This was also confirmed and emphasized by 
the UNESCO’s General Conference in its 2003 Declaration Concerning the Inten-
tional Destruction of Cultural Heritage,41 adopted in response to the destruction 
 
36 Prosecutor v. Krstić, ICTY Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment of the Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, 
para. 580.
37 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 
277.
38 Case 002, Indictment, 15 September 2010, Case File No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC-OCIJ, paras. 
1420-1421, http://www.eccc.gov.kh/sites/default/files/documents/courtdoc/D427Eng.pdf [accessed: 
10.11.2015].
39 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Reports 2007, p. 43, 
para. 344; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia 
v. Serbia), Judgment of 3 February 2015, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/118/18422.pdf [accessed: 
7.11.2015], para. 390. 
40 UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin, 6 August 1999, UN Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, Article 6.6.
41 UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, 17 October 2003, 
UNESCO Doc. 32 C/Res. 33 (2003).
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of the sixth-century Buddhas of Bamiyan in Afghanistan.42 It reiterated that “the 
development of rules of customary international law has also been affirmed by the 
relevant case-law, related to the protection of cultural heritage in peacetime as 
well as in the event of armed conflict” (Preamble). Moreover, it provided, under Ar-
ticle VI, that “a State that intentionally destroys or intentionally fails to take appro-
priate measures to prohibit, prevent, stop, and punish any intentional destruction 
of cultural heritage of great importance for humanity, whether or not it is inscribed 
on a list maintained by UNESCO or another international organization, bears the 
responsibility for such destruction, to the extent provided for by international law.” 
In relation to this, it seems necessary to mention a remarkable study by the Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross.43 Based on an assessment of the very rich 
source material analysed therein, it concluded that the obligations in this respect 
committed during armed conflicts, both international as well as those of an internal 
nature, is now a fully-established set of norms of customary law.44 This also refers 
to the obligation to restore cultural property removed from territories under mili-
tary occupation.45
The development of general international norms concerning the protection 
of cultural heritage has also been the subject of recent analyses in the interna-
tional legal scholarship.46 Their universally binding nature is interpreted in the 
context of protecting the common interest of all mankind, manifesting itself in 
the protection and promotion of cultural heritage.47 Moreover, it is also argued 
that cultural heritage belongs to global common goods and thus requires interna-
tional solidarity and protection.48 This is usually analysed in relation to the con-
cept of cultural diversity being “a source of exchange, innovation and creativity; 
cultural diversity is as necessary for humankind as biodiversity is for nature”.49 
In fact, cultural diversity has already been recognized and promoted as a global 
common good for a variety of reasons and purposes, including its importance 
 
42 R. O’Keefe, op. cit., pp. 356-357.
43 J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), Customary International. Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1: Rules, Vol. 2: 
Practice, Cambridge University Press, New York 2005. 
44 Ibidem, Vol. 1: Rules, pp. 127-138, 523-525; Vol. 2: Practice, pp. 723-813, 3452 passim.
45 Ibidem, Vol. 1: Rules, p. 137. 
46 For the most complex analysis, see F. Francioni, Au-delà des traités: l’émergence d’un nouveau droit coutu-
mier pour la protection du patrimoine culturel, “Revue générale de droit international public” 2007, Vol. 111, 
pp. 19-42.
47 See J. Blake, op. cit., pp. 119-124.
48 I. Kaul, I. Grunberg, M.A. Stern (eds.), Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, 
Oxford University Press, New York – Oxford 1999, p. 453; F. Francioni, Public and Private in the International 
Protection of Global Cultural Goods, “European Journal of International Law” 2012, Vol. 23, pp. 719-730.
49 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 2 November 2001, UNESCO Doc. 31C/Res., Ar-
ticle 1.
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to peace and stability, progress and development, and the full realization of all 
human rights.50 Therefore a number of international obligations in relation to cul-
tural heritage are sometimes seen as effective erga omnes.51 These particularly 
concern the duty to protect cultural property in the event of armed conflict and 
occupation arising from the 1972 World Heritage Convention.52 It is recognized 
that the very nature and logic of these obligations under this treaty are of “gener-
al or common interest”.53 Thus a breach of obligations towards cultural property 
protected under the 1972 UNESCO regime and situated in the territory of one 
State does not necessarily have to inflict a specific injury on another State, but 
amounts to “an offence against all the State Parties to the Convention”.54
Since the memorable judgement of the International Court of Justice in Bar-
celona Traction,55 international obligations stemming, inter alia, from the protection 
of fundamental human rights or the prohibition of serious crimes of international 
law can be regarded as binding on the entire international community.56 According 
to the ICJ,57 certain norms aimed at protecting the general interest of humanity, 
even if established by a specific group of States, may be deemed to be effective 
erga omnes provided that are accepted and recognized by the international com-
munity. Consequently, these can be invoked against other subjects of international 
law, even those not participating in their creation. As the World Heritage Conven-
tion has been ratified or acceded to by nearly all States of the world, the obliga-
tion to respect and protect cultural property of great importance for every people 
50 For further analysis see A.F. Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Cultural Heritage…, pp. 168-172.
51 F. Francioni, Au-delà des traités…, pp. 19-42.
52 Convention Concerning the Protection of World Natural and Cultural Heritage, 16 November 1972, 
1037 UNTS 151.
53 G.P. Buzzini, L. Condorelli, Article 11: List of World Heritage in Danger and Deletion of a Property from the 
World Heritage List, in: F. Francioni, F. Lenzerini (eds.), The 1972 World Heritage Convention: A Commentary, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, p. 178.
54 Ibidem, see also C. Forrest, International Law and the Protection of Cultural Heritage, Routledge, Lon-
don – New York 2010, pp. 50, 277-278; see also Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 
1962 in the Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment of 11 November 
2013, ICJ Report 2013, p. 281, para. 106.
55 ICJ Rep. 1969, p. 33.
56 Cfr. inter alia Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine Territory, Advi-
sory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports 2004, p. 136, paras. 155-157; Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda), Judgment of 3 February 2006, ICJ Reports 2006, p. 3, para. 41. Read further 
Ch.J. Tams, Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law, Cambridge University Press, New York 
2005; Ch. Tomuschat, J.-M. Thouvenin (eds.), The Fundamental Rules of The International Legal Order: Jus 
Cogens And Obligations Erga Omnes, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden – Boston 2006; M. Ragazzi, The Concept of Interna-
tional Obligations Erga Omnes, 2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2000.
57 See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 11 April 1949, 
ICJ Reports 1949, p. 174, at 185 and Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South-West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 
21 June 1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, paras. 126-127. 
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and/or for international humanity as a whole constitutes a general principle of in-
ternational law of an erga omnes nature.58 The postulate concerning the formation 
of international obligations effective erga omnes with respect to cultural heritage 
at the level of general international law – beyond the exclusive realm of a given 
treaty regime (obligations erga omnes contractantes) – is not however accepted un-
critically. It is primarily argued that the system for international legal protection 
of cultural heritage is based on the respect for the full sovereign competence of 
States to determine the elements of their heritage to be preserved and protected.59 
Some authors therefore formulate more cautious opinions, according to which the 
vast majority of international obligations in relation to the protection of cultural 
heritage do not possess an erga omnes nature at the level of general international 
law, although their further evolution and consolidation are envisioned.60
Internationally Wrongful Acts against Cultural Heritage 
and Their Consequences
Every breach of an international obligation by a State, regardless of the origin of the 
obligation (treaty or customary law) or its character, entails the international re-
sponsibility of that State.61 As regards the violations of cultural heritage obligations 
in the event of an armed conflict, this may be invoked, in the vast majority of cases, 
by a State determined to have been injured, rather than by a third State or their plu-
rality. Accordingly, the breach of an obligation to respect cultural property involves 
legal consequences, as clearly established by Part II of the ARSIWA, those being to 
cease that act, if it is continuing; to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees 
of non-repetition, if circumstances so require; and to make full reparation for the 
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act. In practice, reparation primarily 
takes the form of compensation and satisfaction. In fact, in the above-cited dispute 
before the Eritrea – Ethiopia Claims Commission, the perpetrator State found to be 
responsible for unlawful damage to cultural property was obliged to apologize the 
injured State and to pay monetary compensation.62
58 F. Francioni, Au-delà des traités…, p. 41; F. Francioni, F. Lenzerini, The Obligation to Prevent and Avoid De-
struction of Cultural Heritage: From Bamiyan to Iraq, in: B.T. Hoffman (ed.), op. cit., p. 28.
59 J.P. Fishman, Locating the International Interest in Intranational Cultural Property Disputes, “Yale Journal 
of International Law” 2009, Vol. 35, pp. 359ff.; R. O’Keefe, World Cultural Heritage: Obligations to the Interna-
tional Community as a Whole?, “International & Comparative Law Quarterly” 2004, Vol. 53, p. 195.
60 R. O’Keefe, World Cultural Heritage…, pp. 203-205; A.F. Vrdoljak, Intentional Destruction of Cultural Her-
itage and International Law, in: K. Koufa (ed.), Multiculturalism and International Law, Thesaurus Acroasium, 
Vol. XXXV, Sakkoulas Publications, Thessaloniki 2007, pp. 384-396.
61 Article 1 and 12 of the ARSIWA.
62 Claims Commission for Eritrea and Ethiopia, op. cit., para. 114.
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In this context, it is necessary to recall the principle of restitution-in-kind, ap-
plicable when cultural property has been unlawfully damaged in the event of an 
armed conflict. This principle was partially implemented in the peace treaty prac-
tice following the First World War. Accordingly, under Article 247 of the 1919 
Treaty of Versailles63 Germany had to compensate Belgium with cultural materials 
“corresponding in number and value” to those destroyed in the Library of Louvain 
in 1914. Germany was also bound to hand over certain paintings from its State art 
collections to the Church of St Peter at Louvain, which was heavily damaged by 
German artillery fire in 1914. In fact, the question of restitution-in-kind for damage 
to the cultural heritage of an injured State was intensely discussed during the Paris 
Peace Conference. However, such a form of reparation for cultural loss was not 
conclusively accepted as a general rule of post-war settlements,64 since similarly 
founded claims by France and Italy were not seriously considered and eventually 
rejected.65
Undoubtedly, the obligation to restore cultural property unlawfully appro-
priated and transferred from militarily occupied territories constitutes the fun-
damental consequence of a breach of the obligation to protect cultural heritage in 
armed conflicts. Moreover, “it can nevertheless be concluded that the obligation 
to return illicitly exported cultural property is customary because, in addition to 
support for this rule found in the practice, it is also inherent in the obligation to 
respect cultural property, and particularly in the prohibition on seizing and pillag-
ing cultural property”.66 In addition, the primacy of restitution of cultural proper-
ty has also been reiterated in relation to the removal of such materials during the 
course of genocidal practices and other “circumstances deemed offensive to the 
principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience”.67 Once again the much 
more problematic question refers to the restitution-in-kind (or compensatory 
restitution) principle with regard to pillaged and lost cultural material. The peace 
treaty practice after the First World War addressed it in several contexts. For in-
stance, under Article 192 of the 1919 Treaty of Saint-Germain68 and Article 176 of 
 
63 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany (Treaty of Versailles), on 
28 June 1919, 225 Parry’s CTS 188. 
64 A.F. Vrdoljak, Enforcement of Restitution of Cultural Heritage through Peace Agreements, in: F. Francio-
ni, J. Gordley (eds.), op. cit., p. 30, see also W. Kowalski, Restitution of Works of Art Pursuant to Private and 
Public International Law, “Collected Courses of The Hague Academy of International Law” 2001, Vol. 288, 
pp. 70-74, and the bibliography provided therein.
65 A. Jakubowski, State Succession in Cultural Property, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015, pp. 63-64.
66 J.-M. Henckaerts, L. Doswald-Beck (eds.), op. cit., Vol. 1: Rules, p. 137.
67 UNESCO Doc. 181/EX/53 Add, Annex I, p. 2.
68 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria together with Protocol and 
Declarations (Treaty of St Germain-en-Laye), 10 September 1919, 226 Parry’s CTS 8.
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the Treaty of Trianon,69 Austria and Hungary respectively had to “restore objects 
of the same nature as those referred to in the preceding Article which may have 
been taken away since 1 June 1914 from the ceded territories, with the exception 
of objects bought from private owners”. It seems that such a form of reparation 
was recognized at the end of the Second World War as well. In fact, the 1945 Paris 
Conference on Reparation stated that “objects (including books, manuscripts and 
documents) of an artistic, historical, scientific (excluding equipment of an indus-
trial character), educational or religious character which have been looted by the 
enemy occupying Power shall so far as possible be replaced by equivalent objects 
if they are not restored”.70 In 1946, the Allied Control Council for Germany (Con-
trol Council) adopted a final definition of “restitution” which was applicable to the 
entire German territory71 and which also provided that restitution-in-kind could 
be ordered with regard to goods of a unique character whose restoration was not 
possible. At the same time, this very far-reaching principle was questioned by the 
US administration as early as 1947, when it argued that the extensive application 
of cultural replacement would not be consistent with the principle of protection 
of the cultural property of all nations, including the German people.72 On the oth-
er hand, in the Soviet occupation zone the principle of compensatory restitution 
was extensively applied in the form of retention of cultural property as war repa-
rations. Such a practice has been largely criticized, since on the one hand the ac-
tual removal of cultural material from Germany constituted de facto war plunder 
contrary to the rules of occupation, and on the other hand the choice of concrete 
objects and collections was made unilaterally by the victorious party.73 Thus, par-
agraph I.3. of the First Hague Protocol, concluded few years later, specifically and 
expressly forbade the appropriation and retention of cultural property as war 
reparations. However, the assessment of the measures taken in years 1944-45 in 
relation to German cultural property still remains a subject of much controversy 
in cultural relations between Russia and Germany.74 Perhaps the most striking 
example of such a controversy can be seen the negotiations on the adoption of 
69 Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary together with Protocol and 
Declarations (Treaty of Trianon), 4 June 1920, 6 LNTS 187.
70 Final Act and Annex of the Paris Peace Conference on Reparation, 21 December 1945, Annex 1: Reso-
lution on the Subject of Restitution in J.B. Howard, The Paris Agreement on Reparations from Germany, United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington DC 1946, p. 19.
71 I. Vásárhelyi, Restitution in International Law, Publishing House of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
Budapest 1964, p. 87.
72 W. Kowalski, op. cit., p. 154.
73 See, for example, A. Gattini, Restitution by Russia of Works of Art Removed from German Territory at the End 
of the Second World War, “European Journal of International Law” 1996, Vol. 1, pp. 67-88.
74 See, for example, P. Kennedy Grimsted, Legalizing “Compensation” and the Spoils of War: the Russian Law 
on the Displaced Cultural Valuables and the Manipulation of Historic Memory, “International Journal of Cultural 
Property” 2010, Vol. 17, pp. 217-255.
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the 2007 UNESCO Draft Declaration of Principles Relating to Cultural Objects 
Displaced in Connection with the Second World War.75 This provided for an ob-
ligation to return cultural property to the territories from which they were was 
taken. The final text of this document, in contrast to the initial drafts,76 did not 
provide for the possibility of restitution-in-kind and explicitly excluded the reten-
tion of cultural objects as war reparations. Primarily for these reasons the adop-
tion of the said instrument was opposed by both Russia77 and Poland.78 The latter 
State claimed that the exclusion of the principle of restitution-in-kind constitut-
ed an unjustified abrogation of the regime adopted in the Allied legislation after 
the Second World War, and therefore the Draft Declaration would be beneficial 
only for some States (Germany) at the expense of others. Poland also emphasized 
that the Draft Declaration did not “constitute a source of international law” and 
it would serve only as “a political act, indicating possible procedures and forms of 
resolving a particular issue, in this case the issue of cultural objects displaced in 
connection with the Second World War”.79
Irrespective of these controversies relating to the law applicable in 1945, it is 
clear that today reparations for the violation of rules on the protection of cultural 
heritage in the event of an armed conflict must not involve the retention of cultural 
objects of the perpetrator State by the injured State, at the expense of the popu-
lation of the former. An opposite view or act would be in an obvious contrast to 
the regime of the First Hague Protocol. Moreover, it would also violate the cultural 
human rights of those who enjoy a given heritage, since States are no longer recog-
nized as the sole and exclusive decision-makers in the realm of cultural heritage,80 
the protection of which is gradually becoming perceived as a matter of human 
rights law.81 However, these arguments do not entirely preclude the application of 
the principle of restitution-in-kind as a form of reparation for damage to cultural 
heritage in the event of an armed conflict. In fact, “the international community 
has approved restitution-in-kind or compensation where the item cannot be re-
turned, because it has been destroyed, lost, or it [its return] may impact negative-
75 9 March 2007, UNESCO Doc. 34C/22, Annex.
76 L.V. Prott, Principles for the Resolution of Disputes Concerning Cultural Heritage Displaced During the Second 
World War, in: E. Simpson (ed.), The Spoils of War, Harry N. Abrams, New York 1997, p. 229.
77 UNESCO Doc. 34C/22, Annex II, pp. 4-5.
78 Ibidem, pp. 2-4.
79 Ibidem, p. 3.
80 For further analysis see, for example the studies in the volume edited by E. Waterton, S. Watson, Heri-
tage and Community Engagement: Collaboration Or Contestation?, Routledge, London – New York 2010.
81 See A.F. Vrdoljak, Human Rights and Cultural Heritage…, pp. 139-174; eadem, Liberty, Equality, Diversity: 
States, Cultures and International Law, in: eadem (ed.), The Cultural Dimension of Human Rights, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York 2013, pp. 26-70; J. Blake, Taking a Human Rights Approach to Cultural Heritage Protection, 
“Heritage & Society” 2011, Vol. 4, pp. 199-238.
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ly on the cultural or religious heritage of the group against whom the restitution 
order is made”.82 For instance, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herze-
govina (HRCBiH), a mixed national–international and sui generis court which sat 
from March 1996 to September 2003,83 applied this principle in a case involving an 
Orthodox Church built in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the place of a mosque destroyed 
during the war in 1993. Clearly, the application of restitution as a preferred remedy 
was not feasible. The HRC BiH declined to order the removal of the church, and it 
instead ordered restitution-in-kind by requiring Republika Srpska to provide a par-
cel of land available to the Islamic Community and allow for the (re)con struction of 
a new mosque on this alternative site.84
As already highlighted, certain international cultural heritage obligations re-
lating to States’ conduct in the event of armed conflicts can be effective erga omnes. 
Arguably such a status is enjoyed by the obligation to respect, during armed con-
flict, cultural heritage that is particularly important to all humankind, such as those 
recognized as World Heritage Sites. In this regard, the question emerges: which 
State is entitled to invoke international responsibility against the State determined 
to have carried out an internationally wrongful act against such universally pro-
tected cultural heritage? Undoubtedly in the first instance the State(s) which are 
directly affected are eligible to so, in accordance with the definition adopted in Ar-
ticle 42 of the ARSIWA. One may ask, however, whether the obligations to protect 
cultural heritage in the event of armed conflict, in particular those relating to goods 
of special importance for the entire international community, may give rise to the 
international responsibility of a State in relation to a larger group of States or the 
international community as whole?85 Thus the question arises as to the legitima-
cy of actio popularis lodged by any State in the interest of the entire international 
community. According to the provisions of Article 48.1 of the ARSIWA, any State 
other than the injured one is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State 
provided that: “(a) the obligation breached is owed to a group of States including 
that State, and is established for the protection of a collective interest of the group; 
or (b) the obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole”. 
 
 
82 A.F. Vrdoljak, Genocide and Restitution: Ensuring Each Group’s Contribution to Humanity, “European Jour-
nal of International Law” 2011, Vol. 22, p. 45.
83 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 14 December 1995, 35 ILM 
(1996) 89, Annex 6: Agreement on Human Rights.
84 Islamic Community in Bosnia Herzegovina v. Republika Srpska (Zvornik Mosques), CH/98/1062, Decision on 
Admissibility and Merits, 12 October 2001, 194, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Di-
gest, Decisions on Admissibility and Merits 1996-2002 (2003), p. 177; see further A.F. Vrdoljak, Genocide and 
Restitution…, p. 45.
85 In the latter instance, such a violation may amount to a serious breach of an obligations under peremp-
tory norms of general international law, as defined by Article 40 of the ARSIWA.
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Although international practice as well as the codified regime of the ARSIWA are 
not conclusive in this regard, it should be noted that the ICJ in its recent judgment 
in a case aut dedere, aut iudicare (Belgium v. Senegal) held that that with respect 
to obligations effective erga omnes, every State has “a legal interest” in their ob-
servance.86 Thus, any State can claim that it has locus standi before international 
courts to assert a claim to cease the alleged infringement by another State of an 
erga omnes obligation. Such a construction of international responsibility for the 
breach of cultural heritage obligations erga omnes would potentially strengthen 
the existing mechanisms for the protection of heritage of great value to all human-
kind in the event of armed conflicts. However, as already explained, the existence 
of a well-established set of such obligations has not been widely and unanimously 
accepted by the international community. 
Cultural Heritage and State Succession to International 
Responsibility
Continuity and Negative Succession Rule
Another problematic issue regards the consequences of an internationally wrong-
ful act against cultural heritage and the law on State succession. Here it is neces-
sary to consider situations which involve the continuity of international personal-
ity, as well as those which distinguish the identity of pre-succession States from 
that of new States. Accordingly, a continuing State retains its pre-existing rights 
and obligations arising from internationally wrongful acts, irrespective of the fact 
of State succession. However, the situation of a successor State is much more ob-
scure.87 In this regard, international delicts have long been considered as being of 
a “personal” nature and thus they could only be attributed to the State responsible 
for committing them, and not to its successor.88 Consequently, the under the nega-
tive succession rule, the passing of international responsibility from the predeces-
sor to the successor State has long been excluded.89 Thus, the obligations arising 
from the commission of such an act were claimed as being non-transmissible and 
non-enforceable. However, the developments of the post-Cold War internation-
al practice90 and the new doctrinal approaches postulated in international legal 
 
86 Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), ICJ Reports 2012, p. 422, 
para. 68; see Th. Weatherall, Jus Cogens: International Law and Social Contract, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2015, pp. 374, 382.
87 See UN Doc. A/56/10, ch. IV.E.2, p. 119, para. 3.
88 J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General…, p. 441.
89 Ibidem, pp. 437 ff.
90 See in particular, Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgement of 
25 September 1997, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 3.
Andrzej Jakubowski
164
N
r 
2
 2
0
1
5
 (1
)
RESEARCH ARTICLES
scholarship have led to widespread criticism of the negative succession rule. These 
new developments and approaches clearly favour a more equitable approach to 
State succession and international responsibility, based on analysing the factual 
and legal contexts of a given case in light of the principles of international justice 
as well as the stability and security of international legal relations.91 These devel-
opments have also affected succession to the rights and obligations stemming 
from a violation of rules of conduct with respect to cultural heritage applicable in 
armed conflicts.
In reference to State practice with respect to the international responsibility 
of States for violations of cultural heritage obligations, this unsurprisingly refers to 
past pillages of cultural material and its intentional destruction, which has occurred 
mainly in cases of an armed conflict. Apart from the specific cases of Russia and 
the Federal Republic of Germany, which continued their obligations and rights aris-
ing from acts against cultural heritage committed during the Second World War,92 
the most significant cases in practice have involved the dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In particular, Serbia assumed responsibility for vi-
olations of the rules governing war conduct (First Hague Protocol) in relation to 
cultural heritage committed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) during the 
war with Croatia. In fact, on 23 March 2012 Serbia and Croatia signed a protocol on 
the restitution of Croatian cultural assets from Serbia to Croatia. According to its 
provisions more than 1000 works of art taken during the 1990s would be returned 
from Serbia to Croatia.93 In fact, some restitution has already taken place.94 Yet in 
principle the actual arrangements adopted by successor States in matters of re-
sponsibility for the breach of cultural heritage obligations have been usually been 
based on non-succession ex gratia arrangements negotiated between the States 
concerned, rather than by the application of concrete rules or principles of the law 
on State succession.95
91 Cf inter alia J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General…, pp. 435-455; Tai-Heng Cheng, Why New 
States Accept Old Obligations?, “University of Illinois Law Review” 2011, Vol. 1, pp. 1-52; V. Mikulka, State 
Succession and Responsibility, in: J. Crawford, A. Pellet, S. Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibil-
ity, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010, pp. 291-296; B. Stern, Responsabilité international et succession 
d’États, in: L. Boisson de Chazournes, V. Gowlland-Debbas (eds.), The International Legal System in Quest of 
Equity and Universality/L’ordre juridique international, un système en quête d’équité et d’universalité, Brill-Nijhoff, 
Leiden – Boston 2001, pp. 327-356; P. Dumberry, The Controversial Issue of State Succession to Internation-
al Responsibility in Light of Recent State Practice, “German Yearbook of International Law” 2006, Vol. 49, 
pp. 413-448; M.J. Volkovitch, Righting Wrongs: Toward a New Theory of State Succession to Responsibility for 
International Delicts, “Columbia Law Review” 1992, Vol. 92, pp. 2162-2214; W. Czapliński, State Succession 
and State Responsibility, “Canadian Yearbook of International Law” 1990, Vol. 28, pp. 339-359.
92 See A. Jakubowski, op. cit., pp. 193-196.
93 Protocol on Restitution of Cultural Assets from Serbia to Croatia Signed, 23 March 2012, http://www.cul-
turenet.hr/default.aspx?id=44206 [accessed: 13.11.2015].
94 http://www.min-kulture.hr/default.aspx?id=9899 [accessed: 12.11.2015].
95 A. Jakubowski, op. cit., pp. 193-198. 
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Equity and Justice
As already mentioned, the obscure legal regime governing State succession and 
international responsibility became the topic of more extensive scholarly investi-
gation in the early 1990s. Comprehensive research in the field was initiated a few 
years ago at the Institute of Graduate Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. The research 
work of Patrick Dumberry and Marcelo G. Kohen is of particular relevance in this 
regard. An extensive analysis undertaken by Dumberry96 revealed certain common 
patterns in assuming or rejecting succession to State responsibility, depending on 
the types of succession of States and the “specific situations and circumstances”.97 
He advocated that these practices could amount to the emergence of new rules of 
customary international law,98 while at the same time acknowledging that the ex-
istence of already well–established rules of international law in this area is still de-
batable.99 This research was continued within the framework of the 14th IIL Com-
mission, with Marcelo G. Kohen as Rapporteur. The IIL initiative was commenced in 
2009, and four year later the Rapporteur submitted his Provisional Report, includ-
ing a draft Resolution.100 On 28 August 2015 the final text of the resolution Suc-
cession of States in Matters of International Responsibility was adopted (hereinafter: 
the 2015 IIL Resolution). 
This doctrinal instrument provides a catalogue of operational guiding princi-
ples on succession and the consequences of internationally wrongful acts applica-
ble to distinct categories of State succession. Importantly, it is founded on the argu-
ment that “situations involving succession of States should not constitute a reason 
not to implement the consequences stemming from international wrongful acts”.101 
In other words, “no internationally wrongful act must remain unpunished as a re-
sult of the emergence of a case of State succession”.102 Its basic premise consists of 
a distinction between cases of continuity and succession of States. Accordingly, the 
“general, though not absolute, rule proposed is that in cases in which the predeces-
sor State continues to exist, it is this State that continues the enjoyment of rights 
 
0 96 P. Dumberry, State Succession to International Responsibility, Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden – Boston 2007.
0 97 Ibidem, pp. 420-430.
0 98 Ibidem.
0 99 Cfr J. Crawford, State Responsibility: The General…, p. 455.
100 M.G. Kohen, Rapporteur, State Succession in Matters of State Responsibility. Provisional Report and State 
Succession in Matters of State Responsibility. Draft Resolution, 9 August 2013, IIL, 14th Commission, Tokyo Ses-
sion, 2013, http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/annuaireE/2013/IIL_14_Kohen.pdf [accessed: 5.11.2015]; for the 
commentary see A. Jakubowski, op. cit., pp. 265-270. 
101 2015 IIL Resolution, preamble, third recital.
102 M.G. Kohen, Rapporteur, State Succession in Matters of State Responsibility. Final Report, 30 June 2015, 
IIL, 14th Commission, Tallinn Session, 2015, http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/annuaireE/2015/IIL_14_
2015-06-30.pdf [accessed: 14.11.2015], (hereinafter: Kohen’s Final Report), para. 26.
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and the assumption of obligations arising from the internationally wrongful acts 
in which it was involved before the date of State succession”.103 This is founded on 
the observation that “the same subject that has been the victim or the author of an 
international wrongful act holds the rights or obligations arising from this act, no 
matter whether its territory and population have diminished”.104 Therefore a gen-
eral negative succession rule has been proposed in relation to all cases of State suc-
cession in which the predecessor State continues to exist, that is, territorial cession, 
secession, and the creation of a newly independent State.105 However, certain ex-
emptions from this general rule are put forth, which include: an “intrinsically direct 
link of the consequences of the wrongful act with the territory or the population 
concerned”;106 a “wrongful act committed by an entity of the predecessor State 
that later becomes the successor State”;107 or “acceptance by the successor State 
of fulfilling the obligations”.108
Indeed, one of the most important elements of the 2015 IIL Resolution con-
sists of the equitable approach to the territorial factor in resolving issues of State 
succession to international responsibility.109 Accordingly, the principle of an “intrin-
sically direct link of the consequences of the wrongful act with the territory or the 
population concerned” is consistently applied in the provisions concerning specific 
categories of successor States, except those regarding the merger of States or in-
corporation of one State into another existing State. This principle is corrective in 
nature, since alongside territorial considerations it invokes a human link that may 
exist between the wrongful act and the population concerned. In fact, “this is par-
ticularly relevant in cases of violations of human or minority rights”, that is, when 
the wrongful act “has a specific population as a direct victim”.110 Accordingly, the 
continuity of obligations and rights arising from such a serious breach of interna-
tional law will be maintained, irrespective of any non-succession or discontinuity 
claims of the States concerned.
The human dimension and equitable nature of the 2015 IIL Resolution also 
characterizes the solutions proposed with regard to rights stemming from interna-
tionally wrongful acts committed against the predecessor State or the population 
concerned. These may be of great relevance for State succession to international 
 
103 Ibidem, para. 56.
104 Ibidem.
105 2015 IIL Resolution, Articles 11, 12 and 16.
106 Kohen’s Final Report, paras. 57-62.
107 Ibidem, paras. 63-65.
108 Ibidem, paras. 66-69.
109 “The question of where the wrongful act took place is not […] necessarily decisive”, ibidem, para. 57; 
see also P. Dumberry, State Succession…, pp. 285-288 and the literature cited therein.
110  Kohen’s Final Report, para. 62.
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responsibility for the breach of cultural heritage obligations. Importantly, the right 
to redress internationally wrongful acts against cultural heritage may be treated in 
parallel to that of arising from violations of human and minority rights, and thus it 
shall continue to be enforceable irrespective of the transformations experienced by 
States. This may be especially crucial for peoples who did not constitute independ-
ent States when wrongful acts were committed. Importantly, Article 16.4 of the 
2015 IIL Resolution provides that “the rights arising from an internationally wrong-
ful act committed before the date of the succession of States by the predecessor 
State or any other State against a people entitled to self-determination shall pass af-
ter that date to the newly independent State created by that people”. As the IIL Pro-
visional Report of 2013 explains, this principle has already been recognized by both 
State practice and international jurisprudence.111 Arguably, it may provide a newly 
independent State which has emerged in violent circumstances with a strong legal 
argument against its predecessor and/or another State to which a wrongful act can 
be attributed and give it the right to claim reparation for the violation of cultural 
heritage obligations, in particular those established by humanitarian rules for the 
protection of cultural property.112 On the other hand, the newly independent State 
shall be held responsible for the conduct, prior to the date of State succession, of 
a national liberation movement which succeeded in establishing such a newly in-
dependent State. Thus, the responsibility for internationally wrongful acts against 
cultural heritage committed by such a national liberation movement shall, in princi-
ple, pass to the successor State.113 It is important to note that the regime provided 
for by the 2015 IIL Resolution in relation to newly independent States may well 
be tested against international facts very soon. It may be applicable to the ingo-
ing transformations in eastern Ukraine and possible final dissolutions of Libya, 
Syria and Iraq. All these situations have already involved breaches of international 
obligations to protect cultural heritage in armed conflicts, accompanied by grave 
violations of other norms of humanitarian law. In fact, the question may arise as to 
the status and transferability of rights and obligations stemming from current vio-
lations of international cultural heritage obligations in relation to new States that 
would emerge from the current political and social turmoil. 
Finally, the question arises whether such specific considerations would apply 
to rights and obligations arising from the breach of cultural heritage obligations of 
 
111  M.G. Kohen, Rapporteur, State Succession in Matters of State Responsibility. Provisional Report…, pa-
ras. 95-98.
112 It might also be argued that the consolidation of the regime on the succession in secondary rights of 
the predecessor State arising from a wrongful act of another State (irrespective of the specific situation of 
newly independent States), could give to the successor State better legal foundations to protect its cultural 
heritage. Accordingly, a State responsible for the breach of cultural heritage obligation would still have the 
duty to repair, notwithstanding the replacement of an injured State by its successor.
113 Article 16.3 of the 2015 IIL Resolution; see also Article 10(2) of the ARSIWA. 
Andrzej Jakubowski
168
N
r 
2
 2
0
1
5
 (1
)
RESEARCH ARTICLES
an erga omnes nature (such as the destruction of a World Heritage Site). Since such 
violations give rise to obligations owed to the international community as a whole, 
automatic succession with respect to them is strongly advocated.114 However, the 
2015 IIL Resolution does not provide for any special regime in this context. Accord-
ing to the Rapporteur, “the consequence of the distinction between erga omnes ob-
ligations and other kinds of obligations is a matter for the law of responsibility”,115 
not that of State succession, since “no distinct consequences arise” in this field: 
“the successor State(s) inherit(s), or not, the rights or obligations stemming from 
the commission of an internationally wrongful act, no matter the nature of the ob-
ligation breached”.116 Arguably, this solution correctly reflects the current state of 
international law. In fact, there is no support, either in State practice or in relevant 
international case law, for the automatic transferability of obligations stemming 
from a grave violation of international law, comprising the breach of an obligation 
erga omnes.117
Conclusions
The international law rules on the protection of cultural heritage in armed conflicts 
would not be effective without an efficient regime governing the consequences of 
their violation. This article has explored the regime of international responsibility 
of States for the breach of two main groups of cultural heritage obligations in the 
event of armed conflicts: to respect cultural property during military operations; 
and to restore cultural material unlawfully appropriated and transferred from oc-
cupied territories. It has been shown that these obligations are not only established 
by relevant treaty provisions, but also reflected in and confirmed under customary 
rules of international law. Moreover, those obligations which relate to the protec-
tion of and respect for cultural heritage of great importance to all humankind are 
ever more often being perceived as effective erga omnes under general internation-
al law. Accordingly, their violation might entail lodging actio popularis by any State, 
including States other than the one(s) directly injured, which would then have locus 
standi to invoke the responsibility of the perpetrator State in the interest of the 
entire international community. However, international practice has not to date 
provided any relevant examples of such an action. 
As regards reparations for the violation of rules of States’ conduct in armed 
conflicts in relation to protected cultural heritage, restitution and compensation 
are the most common forms, as confirmed by international practice and legal schol-
arship.
114  P. Dumberry, State Succession…, p. 298; B. Stern, op. cit., p. 349; M.J. Volkovitch, op. cit., p. 2200.
115 Kohen’s Final Report, para. 25.
116 Ibidem.
117 P. Dumberry, State Succession…, p. 298; B. Stern, op. cit., p. 349.
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It also appears that the regime of State responsibility has been recently consol-
idated with respect to State succession. This is due to a more pragmatic approach 
to the legal effects and consequences of transformations of States observed in 
international practice, and driven by the objective of maintaining the geopolitical 
equilibrium of the international legal order. Moreover, the main policy underlying 
the recent initiative by the IIL has been that no internationally wrongful act must 
remain unpunished due merely to the fact of State succession. The IIL initiative also 
reflects certain “pragmatic” approaches to the matter of State succession, postu-
lating flexible solutions based on fairness and equity.118 In fact, the equitable nature 
of the 2015 IIL Resolution seems to be in line with the character of cultural heritage 
obligations: on one hand these often involve extremely complex historical and po-
litically sensitive aspects, while on the other hand they may be seen as parallel to 
those obligations stemming from the rules on the protection of human and minor-
ity rights. Thus, every internationally wrongful act against cultural heritage in the 
event of an armed conflict entails a duty to provide reparations, irrespective of the 
particular circumstances of a given case with respect to State succession, if that act 
has a direct link with the territory or the human community concerned. 
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